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Abstract
Current theories of social evolution predict the direction of
selection for a given level of assortment. What remains un-
clear is how to determine the direction of selection on assort-
ment itself if this were subject to evolutionary change. Here
we define and analyse a simple model that allows us to inves-
tigate the evolution of assortment. We find that there is only
a positive selection gradient for increased assortment if the
population is polymorphic in the cooperative trait. We further
show that if the individuals in question engage in multiple co-
operative dilemmas simultaneously then there may be a con-
tinued selection on increased assortment which is ultimately
sufficient to resolve severe dilemmas such as the prisoner’s
dilemma.
Introduction
The evolution of cooperation was a problem which Darwin
labelled “his one special difficulty”. In a naïve interpreta-
tion the presence of cooperation (and particularly altruism)
presents a fundamental challenge to the Darwinian view of
nature. Why would individuals be selected to perform ac-
tions which are beneficial to others at a cost to themselves?
The two major attempts at answers to this question come in
the form of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964; Gardner et al.,
2011; Queller, 1985; Maynard Smith, 1964) and group se-
lection (Wilson, 1975; Borrello, 2005). These two processes
have been shown to be mathematically equivalent (Lehmann
et al., 2007b; Foster, 2006; Queller, 1992) as they both es-
sentially depend on population structure that gives rise to
assortment of interactions. Here assortment means that like
individuals will interact more often than would be expected
from random interactions. Self-interested individuals will
cooperate in an assorted population because, by virtue of
being a cooperator, they are more likely to receive the ben-
efits of other cooperators. In agreement with a number of
authors we see assortment as the key factor in the evolution
of cooperation (Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza, 1983; Fletcher and
Zwick, 2006; Godfrey-Smith, 2008; Michod and Sanderson,
1985; Sober, 1992).
An outstanding puzzle for the theoretician studying the
evolution of cooperation is to investigate the evolution of as-
sortment/relatedness. In many instances in nature individu-
als may have traits which in effect modify which other mem-
bers of the population they interact with. For instance, dis-
persal rate (Smaldino and Schank, 2012; Pepper and Smuts,
2002; Lehmann et al., 2007a) may have a genetic compo-
nent and hence be subject to selection. The vast majority of
studies of the evolution of cooperation take such parameters
as given; a more complete understanding of the evolution of
cooperation would be facilitated by studying, in the most
general and therefore most abstract setting possible, how
such genetic traits effecting assortment will coevolve with
genetic traits determining social behaviours such as cooper-
ation. A small number of recent papers have begun to look at
such processes. Notably Powers et al. (2011) study a model
in which individuals play a public goods game in a group
structured population. In addition to a gene controlling the
social strategy (i.e. cooperate or defect) they also look at the
concurrent evolution of a gene which determines a group
size preference of the individuals. Individuals disperse and
join new groups, the sizes of these groups are determined
genetically, thus individuals may prefer to be in either larger
or smaller groups. Because a population composed of small
groups is more highly assorted than a population composed
of large groups; this “group size preference” has the effect of
an assortment parameter. In such a model it is found that the
coevolution of population structure and social strategy leads
to a feedback process whereby the evolution of cooperation
and the evolution of social structures that support coopera-
tion facilitate each other so that large levels of cooperation
are eventually selected for.
Jackson and Watson (2015) use the formalism of a meta-
game to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of game
changing behaviour such as assortment. In their model each
agent has a genetically determined payoff matrix represent-
ing a desired game, as well as a gene determining their social
strategy. Unlike conventional game theoretic studies, which
simply investigate the dynamics of a given game, this model
allows for the underlying game to be altered via the process
of natural selection. They find that a strong linkage disequi-
librium emerges, whereby cooperators choose a game that is
favourable to cooperators and likewise for defectors. Which
of these two strategies ultimately wins depends upon the
equilibrium properties of the game. If the equilibrium of the
initial game is dominated by cooperators then selection will
change the game towards the harmony game, thereby further
entrenching cooperation. However, if defection dominates
at equilibrium then selection will move the game towards
a more severe dilemma, and thus further entrench defection.
For selection to have any effect on the underlying game there
must be some polymorphism in the social strategy, which is
not the case in the prisoner’s dilemma at equilibrium.
One of the intermediate aims of this paper is to present
a model for the evolution of assortment which is more ab-
stract, and hence more general, than any previous model.
This is desirable as it allows one to dispose of many arbi-
trary modelling assumptions. We look at the coevolution of
assortment and social strategy in a cooperative dilemma and
investigate under what conditions there is a positive selec-
tion gradient on increased assortment. In agreement with
previous studies we find that such a gradient only exists if
there is currently a polymorphic level of cooperation in the
population. In the language of two-player games this is a sit-
uation represented by a snowdrift game. We find that games,
such as the prisoner’s dilemma, which have no cooperation
at equilibrium, do not result in a selection for increased as-
sortment. Thus, such a mechanism cannot “resolve” a pris-
oner’s dilemma. Note that the prisoner’s dilemma game rep-
resents the biological scenario of strong altruism, which is
often observed in nature (West et al., 2007).
The second contribution of this paper is to show a plau-
sible scenario in which assortment can be increased suffi-
ciently by selection to levels high enough to “solve” the pris-
oner’s dilemma (or in other words levels high enough to ob-
serve strong altruism). The principal idea is that individuals
will be engaged in multiple social interactions at once, as-
sumed to be controlled by genes at different loci. Thus, any
two individuals will engage in a large number of social inter-
actions simultaneously. A simple example may be a species
of bacteria that may produce a number of public goods, each
of which is simply a protein. Each individual bacterium may
or may not produce each public good. Thus, the multiple
interactions within the species can be represented via a se-
ries of games (rather than conventional studies which con-
sider only one game taking place). Each individual may be
a cooperator or a defector in each game independently of
whether or not they cooperate or defect in other games. In
such an instance it may be the case that one of these games
is a snowdrift game and hence provides a positive selection
gradient for increased relatedness until a sufficient level of
assortment has arisen to fixate cooperation at this locus. As
a bi-product of this process other games will become trans-
formed such that they are then polymorphic (i.e. contain a
mixture of both cooperators and defectors). Given enough
games between individuals there will be a continual selec-
tion on increased assortment so that the population ends up
highly assorted and therefore cooperation can evolve even
for much more severe dilemmas.
Very few authors have looked at the possibility of the out-
come of multiple games being played at once or sequen-
tially between agents/individuals. Those that do, do so from
within economics or psychology. In particular a number of
authors (Bednar and Page, 2007; Bednar et al., 2012; Grimm
and Mengel, 2012) have looked at the consequences of mul-
tiple, and qualitatively different, games being played in se-
quence between subjects. The key themes of these papers
tend to be to do with cognitive spill-over, i.e. how the out-
come of one game might affect another. Otherwise they are
to do with the cognitive load on the individual i.e. how in-
dividuals might use heuristics or rules learnt in one game
to reduce the computation needed to solve other games. To
the best of our knowledge no authors have looked at the dy-
namics of multiple games from within evolutionary game
theory. One reason for the lack of such a study is that the
basic result, i.e. that each game reaches the ESS indepen-
dently, is not interesting unless one allows for some manner
of epistatic interaction between games. In our model the
epistasis comes via the intermediary of the evolving assort-
ment parameter. With this interdependence the presence of
multiple games results in a qualitatively different outcome,
as we shall show.
Model
We shall restrict our analysis to those social interactions
which can be represented via pair-wise interactions. Such
interactions can be represented via a two-player game. San-
tos et al. (2006) show that the space of all possible two-
player, two-strategy, symmetric games is two dimensional.
The payoff matrix for which is given by:
M =
(
1 S
T 0
)
(1)
In which the reward for mutual cooperation is normalised to
one, and the punishment for defection to zero. T parame-
terises the temptation to defect against a cooperator, and S
the sucker‘s payoff received by cooperating against a defec-
tor.
One can neatly handle the effects of assortment via a
transformation of the game. A level of assortment, α , is de-
fined as follows: with probability α an individual is paired
with another individual with the same strategy as itself, and
with probability 1−α it is paired with a random individual.
It can be shown (van Veelen, 2011) that the outcome of a
game M under assortment α is equivalent to the outcome of
the game M′ with no assortment, where:
M′i j = αMii+(1−α)Mi j (2)
Thus one can consider assortment as an effective transfor-
mation of the game into a more harmonious one, as figure 1
Figure 1: The space of all two-player symmetric coopera-
tive dilemmas and the effects of assortment. Each point in
the space represents a two player game parameterised via S
and T , the colour represents the equilibrium level of cooper-
ation reached from an initial condition of one half coopera-
tors (one represents cooperate and zero defect). Each arrow
represents the effective transformation of the game under as-
sortment of α = 0.07. Assortment has the effect of trans-
forming the game towards the Harmony (top left) region of
game space, thus making it more cooperative.
illustrates.
Agents play many games simultaneously, the strategy in
each is determined at a separate locus. It is thus possible
for an agent to cooperate in some games, whilst defecting in
others. All agents play all games with all other agents. The
overall payoff they receive is simply the mean of the payoffs
from all games.
There are NG games being played at once. An array of
matrices determines all of the games such that the kth game
is given by:
Mk =
(
1 Sk
Tk 0
)
(3)
Each value of S and T is chosen at random from the uni-
form distribution S ∈ [−1,1] and T ∈ [0,2].
In addition to social strategies in multiple games the
agents have a gene for a desired level of assortment, αi. With
probability αi agent i interacts with a clonally related indi-
vidual, that is it has the same value of the gene at all loci.
With probability 1−αi it enters a pool of players, and there-
fore interacts with an agent chosen randomly from the subset
of those other individuals who have also chosen to enter the
pool.
Selection proceeds in a generational GA using fitness pro-
portionate selection. Mutation may occur at a locus control-
ling social strategy; with probability µs each locus changes
to its opposite strategy. The assortment gene is mutated
with probability µa, and subsequently changes by an amount
drawn from the normal distribution with mean zero and stan-
dard deviation 0.05 (the results do not depend sensitively on
the particular choice of these parameters). If the value mu-
tates outside of the permitted range it is simply scaled back
to zero/one. We assume that the time scale of evolution is
slower for assortment than it is for game strategy, so that the
game strategy is always in equilibrium and that mutations in
α occur gradually. We also assume that the primitive state of
the population is freely mixed. We thus begin our simulation
with α = 0 for all agents, and allow strategy frequencies to
reach equilibrium before ‘turning on’ a small mutation in α .
In addition to this there is also a small cost to being as-
sorted, k×αi, which increases linearly with the agents as-
sortment (typically k = 1× 10−3 unless otherwise stated).
This cost is introduced to ensure that all change in assort-
ment is adaptive, rather than being due to drift, when all else
is equal then selection will not favour an increase in assort-
ment. This cost is kept small so as not to effect the direction
of selection significantly in cases other than drift.
Results
We proceed by investigating special cases of the more gen-
eral model. Firstly we look at a model in which assortment
evolves but there is only one game being played. Secondly,
we look at multiple games, but in the absence of assortment.
Finally, we analyse the full model with both evolvable as-
sortment and multiple games.
The Evolution of Assortment with a Single Game
We first sketch a mathematical argument, and go on to com-
pare it with a simulation based model.
Let the frequency of cooperators in the pool be pC and
likewise for defectors pD. Then the payoff an individual
with strategy i gets (as a function of α) is:
pii(α) = αMii+(1−α) [pCMiC+ pDMiD] (4)
pC is calculated by taking a mean of the number of coopera-
tors, weighted by the chance that they enter the pool, which
is 1−αi. EC is the expected number of cooperators in the
pool:
EC =∑
i
si(1−αi) (5)
Where si = 1 for a cooperator and 0 for a defector. The
sum runs over all members of the population. Similarly for
defectors:
ED =∑
i
(1− si)(1−αi) (6)
It follows that:
pC =
EC
ED+EC
(7)
and
pD =
ED
ED+EC
(8)
To investigate this model further one simply needs to de-
termine when individuals with a slightly larger than normal
level of desired assortment can invade a population. We
consider a population composed of individuals who all have
the same value for desired assortment α , and then simply
asked whether a mutant with a slightly larger value of de-
sired assortment α + δα can invade this population. This
can be more simply answered by looking at payoff and ask-
ing whether or not this is an increasing function of α . The
payoff to cooperators is given by:
pic(α) = α+(1−α) [pC+SpD] (9)
= (1− pC−SpD)α+ pC+SpD (10)
Because S < 1 it follows that (1− pC−SpD) > 0 and thus
pii(α) is an increasing function of α , which means that there
is always a selection pressure for existing cooperators to in-
crease their values of αi.
What about if the population consists entirely of un-
assorted defectors? We then wish to know the value of α
for which cooperators can invade, i.e.:
pic(α) > pid(0) (11)
α+(1−α)S > 0 (12)
because we consider cooperators invading in infinitesimal
quantities we assume pC = 0 and also pD = 1. Equation
(12) reduces to:
α >
S
S−1 (13)
Therefore, in the limit of infinitesimal increase in α , cooper-
ators can only invade if S> 0 (found by setting α = 0 in the
above equation); that is α will only increase in a snowdrift
game.
The above argument is a sketch of a formal mathemati-
cal argument in which a number of simplifying assumption
were necessary. We complement this argument with a agent
based genetic algorithm, which includes stochastic effects
not present in the mathematical model. We run the full sim-
ulation model, but set NG = 1. We record the level of mean
α and mean cooperation at equilibrium and plot these over
the space of all possible games on the TS plane. The results
are presented in figure 2.
Figure 2: Equilibrium levels of cooperation (top) and α (bot-
tom) over the space of all possible games. Only snowdrift
games provide a positive selective gradient on α .
The conclusion of the model is that a positive selection for
assortment will only occur if there exists some preliminary
level of cooperation at equilibrium. As there is mutation on
strategy there is also a small amount of selection pressure to
increase assortment even in games which are totally dom-
inated by cooperators (as is the case in the harmony game
and some of the stag hunt game). This is to protect against
the occasional introduction of defectors into the population.
In the snowdrift regions in which the population is almost all
cooperate, and also in the region in which S ' 1 there is lit-
tle increase in assortment. Although a purely mathematical
argument asserts that there will be selection for assortment,
stochastic effects and the small cost to assortment counteract
this effect in the marginal cases.
Multiple Games in the Absence of Evolvable
Assortment
This model is simply the full model minus the possibility of
evolvable assortment. Thus, each allele represents the social
strategy in an independent game. We find that the equilib-
rium level for each game is simply equal to the game’s ESS.
In other words the presence of multiple games does not af-
fect the outcome of selection. This is to be expected as there
is no epistasis between the different alleles. Figure 3 shows
a typical output of this model. For ease of interpretation we
create a scatter plot of the games being played on the TS
plane alongside the evolution of strategy frequencies.
Figure 3: Many random games being played. We record
the frequency of the population that plays cooperate at each
allele. This matches predictions for the ESS of each game
independently (dotted lines).
The Evolution of Assortment with Multiple Games
Finally we present findings for the full version of the model,
in which assortment is subject to selection, and the agents
engage in multiple games. We choose seven random points
on the TS plane and let the simulation run to equilibrium.
The key finding here is that the presence of multiple games
allows for a continuous selective pressure towards increased
assortment. Each social strategy gene is not directly affected
by other social strategy genes. However, there is epistasis
between them, but via the intermediary of the assortment
allele. Any game that is polymorphic (i.e. is a snowdrift
game) creates a selection pressure on increased assortment.
This occurs until the game is transformed into a Harmony
game. Other, non-polymorphic games do not give rise to
any selection pressure on assortment. However, a certain
level of assortment may transform a prisoner’s dilemma into
a snowdrift game, thus engaging further selection pressure
for increased assortment. This process may repeat until a
level of assortment has evolved sufficient to resolve all such
dilemmas. Whether this occurs depends upon the details
of where the various games lie, but the probability of at
least one game being polymorphic clearly increases with the
number of games being played. Figure 4 shows one example
of how this process may work, and one example of when it
fails to do so. In the example in which there is no significant
increase in assortment the initial distribution of games does
not include a snowdrift game, whereas in the other example
the initial distribution does include a snowdrift game, thus
eventually providing enough assortment to resolve the pris-
oner’s dilemma. This particular instance of the model uses a
population size of 1028 and µa = µT = 5×10−3 and is run
for 1600 generations.
Figure 4: The dynamics of a simulation with 7 randomly
chosen games. In each panel: top left: change in the mean
value of α over time. Bottom left: change in allele fre-
quency for each game locus. Right: position of games in
ST space, dotted lines represent the effective transformation
of the game due to increasing α .
Discussion
It is known in the field of evolutionary biology that popula-
tion structure is important when considering the evolution of
social traits (Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza, 1983). Specifically
positive assortment can allow for the evolution of coopera-
tive or altruistic behaviour. Formalisms such as kin selec-
tion (Hamilton, 1964; Grafen, 1982; Maynard Smith, 1964)
and multi-level selection (Price, 1970; Okasha, 2009) allow
one to make precise calculations of the expected change in
the frequency of a cooperative allele due to selection (see
for example Gardner et al. (2011)). Furthermore, the natu-
ral world is full of examples of cooperative behaviour, such
as the cooperation between cellular slime moulds (Strass-
mann et al., 2011), eusocial insects (Hölldobler and Wilson,
1990) or the cells of a multicellular organism (Michod and
Roze, 2001; Buss, 1987; Queller, 2000). In many cases the
population structure of such organisms may have a genetic
component and thus be subject to evolutionary change. For
example, trees may alter the dispersal radius of their seeds
(Pepper and Smuts, 2002), birds may alter the time at which
they leave their natal group (Bulmer, 1994), social wasps
may alter the number of eggs they lay in one host (Ode and
Strand, 1995). In addition, multicellular organisms undergo
a unicellular bottleneck which may be an adaptation that in-
creases the genetic homogeneity of the organism (Ryan and
Watson, 2015). Whilst it is at least plausible that many of
these feature are adaptations there lacks a unified theoretical
understanding of the conditions under which an increases
positive assortment will evolve.
Recently a number of authors (Powers et al., 2011; Jack-
son and Watson, 2015) have begun to address this issue. One
point that has emerged from these studies, and is backed by
a formal mathematical argument here, is that selection will
not increase positive assortment unless the underlying game
is polymorphic. Games such as the prisoner’s dilemma are
not polymorphic at equilibrium, and therefore selection on
assortment cannot “get started”. Furthermore, these games
represent the biologically prevalent case of strong altruism
(see for example Doncaster et al. (2013)). We have pre-
sented a potential resolution to this problem: if individuals
interact in many social dilemmas simultaneously then there
may exist a feedback process whereby the weaker dilemmas
transform the stronger dilemmas into weaker ones and even-
tually all dilemmas are resolved.
Biologically this could represent, for example, the evolu-
tionary path towards multicellularity (see also Michod and
Roze (2001); Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1997); Ispola-
tov et al. (2012); Grosberg and Strathmann (2007); Jablonka
and Lamb (2006)). The cells of a proto-organism will even-
tually need to cooperate in many different manners, such as
by producing different public goods with differing costs or
by refraining from different forms of selfish reproduction,
each of which with a different benefit. Our model shows
how this can be thought of as a continuous process, rather
than a binary one (see Godfrey-Smith (2009)). The likeli-
hood of this happening is greatly increased as the number
of dilemmas being played increases. It seems plausible that
the case of individuals playing one single social dilemma is
an idealisation, and that in reality individuals, having many
genes, and many potential social interactions will usually
be engaged in a very large number of social interactions at
once, thus making the transition to social living possible.
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